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The goal of this paper is to measure Palestinians' attitudes towards a peace process
and their determinants. One novelty is to dene these attitudes as multidimensional
and to measure them carefully using a exible item response model. Results show that
education, on which previous evidence appears contradictory, has a positive eect on
attitudes towards concessions but a negative eect on attitudes towards reconciliation.
This could occur if more educated people, who currently have very low returns to
education, have more to gain from peace but are less willing to reconcile because of
resentment acquired due to their experience.
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11 Introduction
The Arab-Israeli conict is one of the most complex and emotion-laden political problems
of recent times. This dispute between the State of Israel and the Palestinians living under
Israeli occupation has played a critical role not only in Middle East politics, but also at the
world level (see Freedman (1979)).
Repeatedly, a two state solution has been proposed, consisting in an independent Pales-
tinian state next to the state of Israel. Several eorts at negotiating such a solution have
taken place and failed. According to many polls, large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians
would also favor a two state solution.1 Despite this basic agreement, there are signicant
areas of disagreement about what constitutes an acceptable solution; not all Palestinians
and Israelis agree on the concessions they are willing to make in order to reach a peace
agreement. Moreover, several authors have emphasized that the lack of forgiveness gener-
ated by the conict may threaten the peace processes in the long run. These factors make
it important to study individuals' willingness to make enough concessions to reach a peace
agreement and to reconcile and normalize the relationship between the two societies.
The goal of this paper is to measure Palestinians' attitudes towards a peace process and
their determinants. One novelty is to dene these attitudes as consisting of two components,
willingness to make concessions and willingness to reconcile, and to measure them very
carefully. Among their determinants, I focus particularly on the role played by education, a
factor for which previous evidence appears contradictory.
Attitudes matter. The Israeli-Palestinian conict has generated a considerable amount
of research. Most of this research implicitly assumes that the conict shapes individu-
als' attitudes and quanties indirect consequences of that. For instance, terrorist activity
aects individuals' preferences, with an eect on macroeconomic outcomes (Eckstein and
Tsiddon 2004); dierent Israeli counterterrorism policies have dierent impacts on Pales-
tinians' attitudes and on expected retaliation (Zussman and Zussman 2006); terror attacks
aect Israelis' attitudes and thereby political outcomes (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2007); and
Israeli violence against Palestinians temporarily leads to more support for radical factions
1See results from surveys conducted by the Palestinian Survey Research among Palestinians and by the
Harry S. Truman Centre among Israelis.
2and to more radical attitudes towards the conict (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari and Paserman 2008).
The work of Jaeger and Paserman (2006, 2007) suggests that while Israeli violent actions
are systematically a response to violent actions by Palestinians, the reverse it is not neces-
sarily true, suggesting that it is essential to understand the factors that shape Palestinians'
attitudes towards peace and towards the resolution of the conict.
However, Palestinians' attitudes have not been studied very much. Only recently have
there been some attempts to study the conict from this point of view. Jasso and Meyersson
(2004) study the eects of identity and social distance on support for key provisions of the
Roadmap, and Friedman (2005) studies the determinants of Palestinians' attitudes towards
diplomacy and attacks. Similarly, Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) nd that expected individual
economic benets from future peace exert a positive eect on attitudes towards peace but
that individuals' current economic situation plays only a modest role. Since there are thus
a variety of views and opinions within Palestinian society, understanding the factors that
shape the attitudes of individual Palestinians is important and could help to identify some
elements for a successful peace process.
One factor that constitutes something of a puzzle is education. Often, violent and ex-
treme positions are attributed to ignorance and to low market opportunities. For instance,
Berman and Laitin (2005) develop a `club good' model where poverty breeds terrorism. This
link can also be found in Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson
(2007). Jaeger et al. (2008) nd that individuals with some college or more advanced edu-
cation are less likely to support Hamas, and more likely to support Fatah or other smaller
factions. International institutions have also made proposals for strengthening higher ed-
ucation in the West Bank and Gaza. For instance, as early as 1994 UNESCO pointed to
education as one of \the rst conditions to be fullled for success of the peace process". In
contrast to this, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) both nd that suicide at-
tackers and participants in violent groups tend to have higher education and living standards
above the poverty line. Similarly, using cross-country data, Abadie (2006) does not nd a
signicant link between poverty and terrorism. Finally, using a unique data set detailing
the biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) estimate the
returns to human capital in suicide bombing and nd that older and more educated suicide
3bombers are assigned to more important targets and perform better (more casualties and
lower probability of failure).
Because the relation between education and political violence is disputed, it is important
to analyze its role for attitudes towards a peace process. In this, it is important to clearly
distinguish income from education, and personal or family income from GDP per capita or
the overall economic situation. While education may drive expected or potential income,
this can be quite dierent from actual income. Indeed, given the currently very depressed
returns to education in Palestine (shown in Section 2), education conditional on current
income is likely to be closely related to an individual's current economic losses from the
conict. Therefore, education and income should not be expected to have similar eects.
Concretely, as argued in Section 3, if the earnings of educated individuals are particularly
depressed relative to a situation of peace, they may be more willing to make concessions to
reach a peace agreement. At the same time, they may be more frustrated due to past
losses, and therefore less willing to reconcile. In contrast, it is not clear how current income
conditional on education would evolve with a peace agreement; individuals may well all
have similar expectations. Similarly, a change in the overall economic situation may aect
attitudes dierently from a change of an individual's situation relative to other Palestinians.
One important contribution of the paper is to pay careful attention to these issues.
Measurement matters. Important advances in this literature are possible in the area of
the measurement of individuals' attitudes. Concepts like attitudes towards peace, towards
reconciliation or towards violence are inherently dicult to measure. Measures based on
one question only, as used in previous work (e.g. `what party do you support?' or `Do
you think that lasting peace with Israel is possible?'), are partial, restrictive and liable to
contain measurement error. The approach I use overcomes these limitations by allowing for
the multidimensionality of attitudes to peace (involving attitudes both towards reconciliation
and towards concessions) and taking into account various facets of each of the dimensions. By
using six items (questions) for each dimension, many aspects of each concept are captured,
arguably allowing for a more reliable measure.
Therefore, the other main contribution of the paper lies in the measurement of the atti-
tudes. Applying a new item response model by Spady (2007), I measure the latent attitudes
4at the individual level and can infer the relation between individuals' attitudes and their
personal and demographic characteristics. The data used is from surveys conducted by the
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). It is particularly useful because
the questions are very precise, repeated over several years, and capture many facets of each
attitude.
The results of the paper indicate that a) There are theoretical reasons for considering
attitudes towards peace as composed of two distinct dimensions; attitudes towards recon-
ciliation and attitudes towards concessions. This multidimensional construct provides new
meaningful insights about the role of education. b) Education is positively related to at-
titudes towards concessions. c) In contrast to the results on concessions, education has a
negative eect on attitudes towards reconciliation. d) Attitudes towards concessions evolve
inversely with GDP per capita. e) Attitudes towards reconciliation comove closely with GDP
per capita; this is particularly pronounced for individuals with high education. f) What pos-
sibly drives the negative eect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is a higher
level of frustration for more educated individuals due to low labor market opportunities. g)
Specic local factors such as the construction of the separation barrier and regional unem-
ployment inuence attitudes towards reconciliation, in particular for individuals with low
education. Attitudes thus react to economic factors; more strongly to local ones in the case
of individuals with low education and more strongly to more aggregate ones for individuals
with high education. Allowing for attitudes to peace to have more than one dimension thus
helps to shed light on the role of education. Its dierent eects in the two dimensions may
elucidate previous apparently contradictory ndings in the literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey describes the labor
market in the West Bank and Gaza and reviews previous evidence on returns to schooling.
Section 3 presents a simple theoretical argument for treating attitudes towards peace as a
composite of two dimensions. This argument will also guide the estimation. In Section 4 I
describe the methodology used to obtain the measure of the attitudes. In Section 5 I present
the data used, and I describe the questionnaire items and the personal and demographic
characteristics of the respondents that play a role in the estimation of the latent attitudes.
In Section 6 I obtain the measure of attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation
5and analyze their determinants and their correlation with economic trends. I also investigate
the channel through which the events of the conict can shape attitudes. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 Labor market and returns to schooling
The Palestinian economy is characterized by a labor market that is completely dependent
on the Israeli market, and strongly inuenced by political and social events. Palestinian
unemployment and domestic wage respond to job opportunities and wages in Israel. Angrist
(1995) analyzes the Palestinian labor market over the period 1981-1987 and nds that over
that period, the unemployment rate of college graduates increased strongly, while returns to
education declined substantially. The college premium fell from was 40% at the beginning of
the period to 20% between 1984 and 1987. Angrist (1995) shows that changes in labor supply
explain an important part of this development. The number of Palestinian college graduates
increased sharply following the opening of Palestinian institutions of higher education, which
had been totally absent before 1972.
Sayre (2001a) studies the same period and stresses some demand factors that also explain
part of the dramatic changes in returns to schooling. He argues that the reduction of
demand for skilled Palestinian workers by the Arab Gulf countries, the increase in demand
for unskilled Palestinian workers in Israel and changes in labor demand coming from changes
in the volume of international trade can explain part of the changes observed during this
period. Using a slightly dierent empirical approach, Sayre (2001b) nds that while supply
changes could still account for most of the decrease in returns to schooling, demand shocks
could explain as much as one-third of the change in the returns to a college. For similar
reasons, the return to college remained low in the period 1995-2001 (Sayre and Miller 2004).
Unemployment and wages in the Palestinian Territories continue to depend on the Israeli
economy and are driven by closures, job permits, changes in the demand of low skilled
workers, etc.
Angrist (1995) and Sayre (2001a) also link the bad labor market prospects for educated
Palestinians from 1981 to 1988 to the uprising of the rst Intifada. Sayre and Miller (2004)
link the similar situation experienced by the Palestinian economy during 1995-2001 to the
6uprising of the second Intifada.
Although recently some papers have analyzed the eects of conict and in particular
border closures with Israel on the Palestinian economy and in particular the labor market
(see Bulmer (2003) or Miaari and Sauer (2006)) none of these studies report returns to
schooling for the period under analysis in this paper (2001-2006). But economic conditions
have worsened since 2000. Despite other factors that may aect the Palestinian economy,
the World Bank (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) repeatedly reported that the closures and
restrictions on movements related to Israeli security concern have harmed the Palestinian
economy and increased unemployment and poverty. The same conclusions are found in
Fischer, Alonso-Gamo and Erickson von Allmen (2001). Figure 1 shows rough estimates of
the college premium in the Palestinian territories for the period under analysis. This gure
shows that the college premium during this period has gone from 16% to 30%. This is much
lower than the college premium in the U.S., which is around 60% in this period (Goldin
and Katz 2007). The dierence is also important if we compare to the returns to schooling
of the Palestinians or Jordanians who emigrated to the US. El-Araby and Ragan (2009)
estimate the returns to education for Arab immigrants in the United States to be 8per year
of schooling for Palestinians in 1990 and 6% for Jordanians in both 1990 and 2000. These
returns are larger than 30/16 divided by 4 years of college.
Not surprisingly, individuals react to this lack of economic opportunities. The results of
a survey performed by Birzeit University indicate that, in 2006, 44% of Palestinians aged
between 18-29 years would like to migrate if that was possible. For individuals aged 30-49,
this was around 30%. These numbers are higher among more educated individuals. (See
Lubbad (2008) for further discussion of the results of this survey.)"
This literature suggests that the depressed opportunities faced by highly educated Pales-
tinians could shape their attitudes towards the peace process. The next section sets out a
simple model showing which relationships we could expect.
73 Education and willingness to make concessions and
to reconcile
Suppose that Palestinians value consumption and derive value from their relationships with
Israelis. These valuations govern their attitudes towards making concessions and towards
reconciliation. The literature on conict resolution suggests that a peace process can be
divided into stages (see e.g. Gawerc 2006). The relevant stages here are the following. In
a rst stage, Palestinians and Israelis have to reach an ocial settlement or resolution and
stop direct violence. Success depends on a negotiation process and on individuals' attitudes
towards concessions on both sides. The second stage of the peace process consists in a
normalization of the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis. This stage involves
reconciliation, psychological healing and reconnecting of the societies.
Suppose that in the rst stage of the conict, Palestinians have the choice of how many
concessions to make. Denote the choice of concessions by s 2 R
+
0 . Making concessions may
lead to a peace agreement with Israel, with the probability p of an agreement increasing in the
amount of concessions made. However, the \marginal product" of concessions in increasing
the probability of an agreement is decreasing and goes to zero in the limit (p0(s) > 0,
p00(s) < 0, 0  p(0) < 1). Also assume that there is no nite amount of concessions that
leads to an agreement with probability 1 (lims!1 p(s) < 1).
Individual Palestinians expect income of w(e) after a peace agreement. They currently
earn  w(e). Both w and  w increases with the individual's education e. Reecting the evidence
discussed above, current income and returns to education are both depressed ( w(e) < w(e),
 w0(e) < w0(e) for all e). Because of depressed returns to education, more educated individuals
suer a larger loss of income due to the conict.
Whereas making concessions could raise future incomes, it also has a psychological (and
possibly also a real) cost ci per unit of concessions. This diers across individuals. It
may depend on demographics, but also vary in unobserved ways. While in principle, the
cost could vary systematically with education, we abstract from this. Individuals then
choose their optimal level of concessions by choosing s to maximize the objective function
p(s)w(e)+(1 p(s)) w(e) cis.2 The optimal s is the theoretical counterpart to the willingness
2If this was about actions, not attitudes, this would of course be a strategic game, where Israeli actions
8to concede we measure in the data. The optimal amount of concessions, if interior, then
satises p0(s)[w(e)    w(e)] = ci. Because p0 > 0, p00 < 0, w(e) >  w(e) and w0 >  w0, the
optimal s increases in education and decreases in the cost of concessions. More educated
individuals have more to gain from concessions, so they are willing to invest more.
Palestinians also value the quality of the relationships they have with people around
them. This includes Israelis, and this allows for an analysis of the willingness to reconcile.
Reconciliation requires eort, but has benets in terms of improving the quality of relation-
ships, and possibly also has economic benets. Denote these benets by R(r;e), where r
denotes eorts to reconcile. The benets depend on education because economic benets of
reconciliation are likely to vary with education. Assume that the marginal product of eorts
at reconciliation, R0, is positive but decreasing (R0(;e) > 0;R00(;e) < 0 for all e).
Engaging in reconciliation also has a psychological cost, as it may be hard to reconcile
with people if past experience with them was bad. This cost increases in the level of frustra-
tion experienced due to the conict. This psychological cost can be seen as hate generated
because Palestinians see Israel as responsible for their miseries. (Glaeser (2005) studies the
formation of hate). The experimental literature on reciprocity (see Fehr and Schmidt (2006))
conrms that subjects forgo rewards if that allows them to punish people who have behaved
unfairly, particularly by rejecting unequal oers in ultimatum games. On a practical level,
this hate and frustration may be linked to the poor labor market conditions and therefore
may vary with individuals' level of education. To capture this, assume that the cost of recon-
ciliation eort c(e) increases in frustration due to the conict, and that frustration is driven
by the dierence between potential and actual wages. Then c(e) = f(w(e)   w(e));f0 > 0 and
c0(e) > 0. Individuals then set their optimal amount of reconciliation to maximize its ben-
ets net of the psychological cost. This yields the optimality condition @R(r;e)=@r = c(e).
Individuals engage in reconciliation up to the point where the marginal benet equals the
marginal cost. More educated individuals prefer a higher level of reconciliation if the ben-
ets from it increase strongly enough with education. If benets do not rise strongly with
education, in contrast, more educated individuals prefer a lower level of reconciliation. This
is because reconciliation is costlier for more educated people because of the wage losses due
also matter for payos.
9to depressed returns to schooling. More generally, any factor increasing w(e) or reducing
 w(e) increases frustration and reduces willingness to reconcile.
4 Measuring individuals' attitudes
4.1 The Item Response Model
In this section, I dene a model for estimating the latent attitudes towards a peace process.
The model used in this paper is a hierarchical item response model3 estimated following the
approach proposed by Spady (2007). 4The model is represented graphically in Figure 2.
From the considerations in the previous section, every individual has attitudes towards
concessions and towards reconciliation that depend on the potential payos and costs they
face. That is, the optimal s implies an attitude towards concessions AC and the optimal r
an attitude towards reconciliation AR. Together, these attitudes constitute the individual's
predisposition towards a peace process. They also cause responses to survey questions on
the issue. Finally, they also underlie agents' behavior; e.g. their political decisions or their
propensity to engage in violence. This last aspect is left for future research.
From the model, education and other factors that systematically aect costs and payos
aect the willingness to make concessions and the willingness to reconcile. Solving the
optimality conditions for the optimal choices then leads to the empirical specication
AC = hC(e;X;C) (1)
AR = hR(e;X;R) (2)
where X is a vector of covariates that captures dierences in individuals' costs or preferences.
The empirical specication thus reects the idea that individual characteristics and experi-
ences as well as community characteristics can be related to individuals' attitudes towards
reconciliation and towards concessions. It is also assumed that these characteristics do not
aect the answers directly, but only through their eect on the attitudes.
3See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for an overview of this type of item response models.
4Item response theory (IRT) models have been widely used in psychometrics to measure latent traits
like ability, trust or other attitudes using test results or survey outcomes. Conrmatory factor analysis has
been used for the same purposes as IRT models (see e.g. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) and Carneiro,
Hansen and Heckman (2003)) The main advantage of IRT models compared to factor analysis is that they
deal with discrete outcomes in a more straightforward way. As all the answers to the survey questions used
in this paper are discrete, IRT models are particularly useful in this context.
10Equations (1) and (2) constitute a structural model with the following underlying as-
sumptions: (1) the expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions about conict
resolution (`item responses') reect corresponding attitudes of the responder; (2) the `atti-
tudes' are enduring individual-specic attributes, given the individual's characteristics and
environment; and (3) each one of the series of item responses used is determined by a single
attitude only (attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards concessions respec-
tively).
The variables used to estimate the individual attitudes and those included in X are
discussed in Section 5. Before that, I describe how to obtain the likelihood function used to
measure the attitudes towards reconciliation and to obtain the correlates with the individual
personal characteristics. The likelihood function and the estimation method used for the
analysis of the attitudes towards concessions only diers in the use of dierent questions.
I denote the items used to construct the reconciliation scale as R and the items used to
construct the concessions scale as C.
4.2 Structural Representation




where A is univariate, Um  U(0;1) and gm() is weakly increasing in U and strictly in-
creasing in A. It is also assumed that Ui ? Uj 8 i 6= j and Ui ? A 8 i which implies that
conditional on A the responses are independent (Ri ? RjjA).5
Personal characteristics may aect the way this latent variable is distributed in the pop-
ulation. We assume that individual characteristics, and particularly education, may aect
the latent variable A, but do not aect the measurements Rm directly. (They can of course
5These assumptions correspond to the standard assumption in item response theory (IRT); unidimen-
sionality (A is unidimensional), monotonicity (gm(A;Um) is strictly increasing in A) and local independence.
See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for a review of hierarchical parametric IRT.
11aect them via A.) Consider the linear case
A = h(X;) = X + " (3)
where "  N(0;1) and " ? X. Assume also that Um ? " and Um ? X.




> > > <
> > > :
1 if Q0(a) < um  Q1(a)
2 if Q1(a) < um  Q2(a)
3 if Q2(a) < um  Q3(a)
4 if Q3(a) < um  Q4(a)
where Qr(a), r = f1;2;3;4g, are thresholds functions for item m, and 0 = Q0(a) < Q1(a) <
Q2(a) < Q3(a) < Q4(a) = 1. Figure 3 shows the graphical representation of the functions
Qr(a). This gure shows that higher item responses are associated to higher values of a, i.e.
if a2 > a1 then the item responses of a2 population stochastically dominate a1. Thus, higher
item responses are associated to higher values of a. This assumption implies that the lines
that indicate the probability of answering k or higher in item j given a have to be downward
sloping. Of course, they cannot cross if probabilities are to be non-negative.
The model is identied if the structure, together with the restrictions of the model,
delivers the distribution of observables:
S = fg(A;U);FUjAg ) FRjA;
where FUjA denotes the cumulative distribution function of a random variable U conditional
on A. From the identication result, the following equality follows:
FUjA(Qr(a)jA = a) = FRjA(rjA = a)
and because of the uniformity of the error term
Qr(a) = FRjA(rjA = a) = Pr(R  rjA = a):
Qr(a) thus is a conditional cumulative distribution function.
The way of modeling Pr(R  rjA = a) diers among dierent types of item response
models. In this paper these functions are modeled as in Spady (2007), using the distribution







where the functions 1(u) and 2(u) are 2 basis functions, chosen to be (shifted) Legendre
polynomials and 1 and 2 are the parameters estimated. From Gr(a) we obtain Qr(a) as
Qr(a) = 1   Gr(a).
To ensure that the lines do not cross, they are constructed as products of the estimated
distribution functions. Consider an item m with 4 possible answers, so r = f1;2;3;4g,
Q4(a) = 1 and Q0(a) = 0 by denition. Assume Q3(a), G2(a) and G1(a) are distribution
functions estimated as described above. Then Q2(a) = [1   G2(a)]Q3(a) and Q1(a) =
[1   G1(a)]Q2(a).6
To build the likelihood function, the conditional probability of a response r, Pr(R =
rjA = a), is obtained as
Pr(R = rjA = a) = Pr(R  rjA = a)   Pr(R  r   1jA = a)
= Qr(a)   Qr 1(a)
To simplify notation, denote Pr(R = rjA = a) as p(rja;r).











Because of the assumption of conditional independence of the responses, it is possible to
express the likelihood function as a product of the conditional item probabilities.  is a
vector of parameters that indicates the eect of X on the mean of A.  parameterizes the
distribution Qr(a;m;r) that enters p(). With two-parameter exponential tilting, it consists
of elements m;r = (1
m;r;2
m;r).
The integral in the likelihood function has no general closed form solution. The inte-
gration is thus carried out using Gauss-Hermite quadrature at 200 grid points. Quadrature
6This also implies that the stochastic dominance is strengthened to dominance in hazard order.
13methods approximate the integral as a weighted sum of function values evaluated over a grid





Gaussian quadrature rules choose not only the weights, but also the evaluation points or
abciss, and can achieve higher precision with a xed number of points. To ensure that
we can take into account even distributions with small variance, Gaussian quadrature has
been applied to 5 dierent segments of the grid, with the segment in the middle having a
higher concentration of points. A Newton-Raphson algorithm is used to maximize the log-
likelihood function. Concretely, we use the BFGS method which builds an approximation
to the Hessian in the course of iteration.7
4.3 Identication
The model is dened as the structure
S = fg(A;U);FUjAg
with
FUjA(Qr(a)jA = a) = FRjA(rjA = a)
and the restrictions described above: Um  U(0;1), gm() is weakly increasing in U and
strictly increasing in A, Ui ? A 8i, Ui ? Uj 8i 6= j. The distribution of a is assumed to be
















RjA(rjA = a) 6= F 0
RjA(rjA = a).
Douglas (2001) shows that nonparametric item response models are only identiable in
an asymptotic sense, i.e., when the number of items tends to innity, in which case the
problem would be the one analyzed by Hu and Schennach (2006). For parametric models
7For a general discussion about estimation procedures for multilevel generalized linear models see Ro-
driguez (2008).




generated by the dierent combinations of responses limits the values of the parameters to a
unique set. If Qr(a) were modeled nonparametrically, the degrees of freedom would be much
greater than the number of constraints, considering that the value of the function at each
point may be viewed as a separate parameter and the constraints derived from the manifest
distributions are not sucient to identify Qr(a). The set up of this paper is parametric;
Qr(a;) is modeled as a function of some parameters.
There are 46   1 = 4095 possible constraints in the model of attitudes towards recon-
ciliation and 37   1 = 2186 in the model of attitudes towards concessions. Since there are
many constraints/points of support, the estimation of Qr(a;), although parametric, is very
exible. The set up of this paper approximates these distributions using two parameters,
therefore the degrees of freedom are larger than the number of parameters to be estimated,
and the model identies the functions gm(). Since the points of support are large enough
(there is enough variation in the data), we can model the latent variables as continuous and
still obtain a exible approximation of Qr(a;).8
5 Data
The data comes from the public opinion surveys designed and conducted by the Palestinian
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). This institution conducted public opinion
polls from 2000, collecting information about attitudes and values of a representative sample
8Some related recent results in the literature do not exactly apply in the present case. Hu and Schennach
(2006) consider a nonlinear measurement error model that is related to the model presented here. These
authors relate the joint densities of the observable variables to the joint densities of the unobservable variables
in the same way as equation 6 shows. This equation admits an equivalent operator representation: LRjX =
LRjALAjX The proof of identication relies on the assumption of the operator LRjA 
R
fRjA(RjA = a)g(A)A .
being `injective'. Intuitively, LRjA will be injective if there is enough variation in the density of R for dierent
values of A (or X). In our case this assumption is not fullled because of the discreteness of R combined
with nite amount of data. Therefore, the proof that Hu and Schennach (2006) propose is not be applicable
in our case.
Also close to our model is the measurement error model analyzed in Hu (2008), where the variable with
measurement error and the misclassied measurements are assumed to be discrete. In that case, the author
shows that the latent model can be expressed as an explicit function of directly observed distribution functions
and that therefore, under this framework fRjA and fAjX are nonparametric identied.
15of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. PCPSR
is an independent nonprot institution and think tank. Its poll results have been used
by numerous researchers, for instance in Krueger (2007). The survey waves used in this
paper are the ones that include identical questions about attitudes towards reconciliation
(December 2001 (poll #3), May 2002 (poll #4), April 2003 (poll #7), March 2005 (poll #15)
and December 2006 (poll #22)) and about attitudes towards concessions (December 2003
(poll #10), December 2005 (poll #18), and December 2006 (poll #22)). These surveys also
include information about personal and demographic characteristics. The only survey that
contains information on both concessions and reconciliation is the one for December 2006.
This data set is particularly useful because questions are very precise and allow dis-
tinguishing between attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions. The items
reecting attitudes towards reconciliation emphasize that the questions refer to steps that
the Palestinians could take once the state of Palestine was established. The items reecting
attitudes towards concessions refer to key issues such as nal borders, the status of Jerusalem,
refugees, and the security arrangements that have been recurrently brought up during peace
negotiations (the Geneva Initiative, the Clinton Parameters and the Taba Negotiations).
This distinction is important because the use of more general questions can lead to mislead-
ing conclusions. For instance, measuring attitudes towards peace using the support for the
continuation of peace negotiations as in Abu Sada (1998) is problematic because individuals'
answers are also aected by other factors like their condence in the leaders involved in the
negotiations. The use of party identication as a way to infer attitudes, as used for example
in Jaeger et al. (2008), can also lead to wrong conclusions since other issues like a person's
degree of religiosity or the current ruling party's level of corruption can play a role. Hence,
the precise wording of the questions in the survey used here makes more precise measurement
possible and makes the data set particularly useful. The full wording of the questions/items
used to estimate the individuals' latent attitudes is shown in the appendix.
Summary statistics of the responses to these items are presented in Table 1. Items
on reconciliation have four possible answers (scale from 1 to 4) and items on concessions
have three possible answers (scale from 1 to 3). A higher score corresponds to a more
positive attitude towards reconciliation or concessions. Even among the items referring
16to one attitude, answering behavior varies over these items. Considering for instance the
question "Would you support to adopt a school curriculum in the Palestinian state that
recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand the return of all Palestine to
the Palestinians?" and the question "In case of a two state solution, would you support to
open borders to free movement of people and goods?", the mean answer diers strongly, at
1.71 for the rst question and 3.04 for the second. This indicates that dierent items carry
information on respondents' attitudes to a varying degree, or capture dierent aspects. Thus,
by focussing on just one questions, or on a narrow subset of questions, valuable information
may be lost. This is also indicated by the pairwise correlation coecients for the items
shown in Table 2; correlations are positive but far from perfect.
The data show some important changes in the composition of the sample regarding the
level of education. One could think that the possibility of an important ow of migration from
the Palestinian territories to other countries could aect the composition of the sample and
therefore could explain the evolution of the attitudes. Some authors who have tried to gather
information on the evolution of emigration ows from Palestine (see Lubbad (2008) and
references therein) have faced the problem that it is dicult to obtain this information since
the Palestinians do not have an eective system of registering departures and arrivals at their
borders as Israel controls these registrations. It also is dicult to obtain this information
from the host countries, since the denition of what constitutes a Palestinian is not always
clear. Lubbad (2007) reports dierent estimates of the number of Palestinians living abroad,
from 1970 to 2006. The magnitude of the estimates diers a lot depending on the source,
but using the results from the PCBS (the only ones that use the same method for 2000 and
2006) emigration does not appear to be very important during the period analyzed here.
To evaluate whether the assumptions of unidimensionality, local independence and mono-
tonicity that are required for identication are fullled in the data, I use Mokken scale anal-
ysis. A more detailed explanation of the Mokken scale analysis is given in the Appendix of
this paper (section A.3). The results of this analysis show that the scales constructed in this
paper fulll the assumptions required by the model.
The theoretical model suggests that some demographic variables are informative about
the individual attitudes. Therefore, they are also used in the estimation. A descriptive anal-
17ysis of these variables is shown in Table 3. This table shows an increase in the percentage of
individuals with high levels of education and with a high degree of religiosity. The theoretical
justication for the inclusion of personal and demographics characteristics in the estimation
is the following:
Education. As seen above, the role of education in shaping attitudes towards a peace
process is not well understood in the existing literature. The goal of this paper is to shed some
light on the connection of education with Palestinians' attitudes. To measure education I use
three dummy variables: Low education (elementary education or less), medium education
(preparatory or secondary education) and high education (college or more).
Religion: personal piety. Tessler and Nachtway (1998) state that \the theoretical link-
age between religion and international politics is based on the assumption that religion plays
a crucial role in shaping both the normative orientation of individuals and their under-
standing of the surrounding world." They nd that dierent dimensions of religiosity have
dierent eects on individuals' attitudes towards politics or towards international conicts.
They nd that support for political Islam and religious activism have a strong eect on an
individual's political views, while personal piety is unrelated to those views. Unfortunately,
the surveys used in this paper only contain information on the degree of personal piety.
The measure of personal piety used are three dummy variables based on the answer to the
following question: \How often do you pray? 1) every day, 2) only on Friday or occasionally,
3) rarely or never."
Economic determinants: household income/family size. The relation between in-
dividuals' current economic situation and their attitudes is a priori ambiguous. It could be
that individuals who are currently doing well believe that this will allow them to benet
more from economic opportunities arising with peace. It may, however, also motivate them
to avoid change, and pit them against an agreement, whereas the poor might support it in
the hope of an improvement in their situation, and because they have little to lose. On the
other hand, they may be frustrated due to their economic situation, and not believe in the
benets of an agreement.
18Controlling for income is also important in order to correctly interpret the eect of
education. Education drives potential or expected income. Actual income may well deviate
from that, in particular in the Palestinian context with recently very low returns to education.
In this sense, the eect of education conditional on income can be interpreted as a measure
of an individual's current economic loss due to the conict.
Finally, it is important to distinguish the eects of individual and aggregate income,
respectively. The eect of individual (relative) income as captured by its coecient may well
be dierent from that of aggregate income, about which results for dierent years contain
information.
In the survey, household income is reported as a categorical variable. We measure income
using three dummies: Low Income (monthly income per person in the household  125$),
medium income (income per person between 125 and 450$) and high income (income per
person > 450$).
Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience but also
due to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be informative.9
Working for the Public Sector. The public sector is an important source of employ-
ment in Palestine. In 2003, public sector employment (by the Palestinian Authority and by
municipalities) accounted for about 26 percent of total employment in the West Bank and
Gaza. For many young men coming from poor families this is the only route of social mobil-
ity. Therefore, working for the public sector is also an indication of how well the individual
is doing. In addition, working in the public sector may of course by itself inuence attitudes.
Being unmarried. Being unmarried in Palestine can be a source of frustration. Marriage
is important because in Palestine, it represents the key to adulthood. It also is a religious
obligation. Marriage is expensive; some families have to save all their lives to aord the
wedding of their children.10 Since the economic situation has been deteriorating in the
9Note that the variable used is age standardized by its mean, and standardized age squared over 100.
10For an illustration, see `The wedding shortage', Navtej Dhillon, Newsweek.com, March 2007. This article
explore why the Middle East has the lowest rates of marriage in the developing world.
19last years, it is possible that individuals who cannot aord marriage seek outlets for their
frustration, translating into more negative attitudes towards reconciliation.
We also control for gender and region of residence as they can inuence the experiences
faced during life.
6 Results
In this section I use the methodology explained above to infer the relationship between
demographics and attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation with a particular
focus on education. I then use regional heterogeneity, in particular the construction of the
separation barrier, to explore how local factors aect dierent educational groups.
6.1 Attitudes towards concessions
Table 4 shows the eect of the personal characteristics on the mean of the probability distri-
bution of attitudes towards concessions for a given person. They correspond to the coecient
vector  in equation (3). The eects are additive, which means that statements such as `more
educated people have more positive attitudes towards concessions' must be understood in a
`ceteris paribus' sense (Spady 2006). Coecients describe deviations from a `standardized'
person. This is a male who lives in Hebron, has the mean age of the sample, is married, has
a medium level of income per family member, is not a refugee, has low education and prays
very often.
Results show that education is positively related to attitudes towards concessions. This
nding is in line with the argument advanced above that more educated people could have
more to gain from an agreement that eases the constraints on the Palestinian economy
and therefore have more to gain from concessions. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the
eect of education over time. To facilitate a visual interpretation, the middle panel of
Figure 4 plots the dierence between the coecients associated with high education and the
coecients associated with low education (from column II in Table 4). The eect of high
education evolves inversely with GDP per capita, indicating that in periods in which market
opportunities are lower, more educated individuals are more willing to make concessions. In
20such periods, the payo from peace may be larger.
Family income also matters; families with lower income tend to support the concessions
discussed in the peace talks. Again, controlling for education, these might be the ones who
have most to gain or least to lose from an agreement. The degree of religiosity reduces the
willingness to make concessions.
Other authors have found that education has a negative impact on attitudes towards
continuing with the peace negotiations after the Oslo agreements (Abu Sada 1998) or towards
the Road Map (Jasso and Meyersson 2004). These authors explain this result by the fact
that better educated respondents have more access to information and are therefore more
aware of the problems of the possible agreements. Because of the dierent questions used to
measure the attitudes, it is dicult to compare their results with the ones in this paper. The
questions used in those papers are related to a particular moment in time and to a particular
negotiation process. It seems likely that the individuals' answers take into account other
factors like the strength of the Palestinian leaders or the international and Israeli political
situation. The questions used in this paper to measure attitudes towards concessions are
more atemporal in the sense that they are related to the key elements that have recurrently
been subject of negotiation in peace talks. Therefore they provide more reliable information
on individuals' general attitudes towards concessions.
6.2 Attitudes towards reconciliation
The previous section described results about willingness to make concessions obtained using
a collection of items Cm. In this section I measure `attitudes towards reconciliation' using a
dierent collection of items Rm.
6.2.1 Education and attitudes towards reconciliation
Results are presented in Table 5. It is clear that they dier substantially from those for
concessions. In particular, results in the rst column show that education is negatively
correlated with attitudes towards reconciliation. The interactions of education with year
dummies shown in the second column show the evolution of the eect of education over
time. They are also plotted in Figure 4. The coecient on high education is negative and
21statistically signicantly smaller than that on low education in all years. The coecient on
the medium education dummy is less negative, parallels the evolution of the high education
coecient, and is signicantly smaller than the low education one in all years except for
2005.
It is instructive to consider the evolution of attitudes over time in more detail. Figure
4 plots the coecients associated to the interactions of education with the year dummies
together with the evolution of GDP per capita. It is clear that attitudes comove with GDP
per capita for all education groups, and more so for the highly educated individuals. (The
correlation between the coecients and GDP per capita is greater than 70% for low and
medium education and over 90% for high education.) In particular, the fall in GDP per
capita from the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000 until 2002 is accompanied by a
steep drop in the attitudes towards reconciliation of the highly educated. Afterwards, as
GDP per capita recovers following the Road Map conference, attitudes also improve again
briey, only to deteriorate again from 2003 onwards. They reach a low point in 2006, the
year Hamas wins the Parliamentary elections. The international response to that victory
again caused an important drop in GDP per capita. Overall, since the start of the Second
Intifada in 2000, per capita GDP in Palestine has fallen by about a third, from $1621 in
1999 to $1129 by the end of 2006. Attitudes have evolved in a similar way.
This is an indication that the economic environment aects attitudes. These results
also lend support to the idea that the depressed market opportunities of highly educated
workers and the frustration generated by the dierence between expected and actual wages
matter for attitudes towards reconciliation (assuming that Palestinians attribute this lack of
opportunities to the conict and the interdependence with Israel).
Despite the importance of economic factors at the aggregate level, we nd that family
income does not have a signicant eect on attitudes towards reconciliation. So relative
income (conditional on education) is not signicantly related to these attitudes. This suggests
that it is overall and not individual economic deprivation that is closely related to attitudes.
These results are similar to those obtained in the literature on education and violence. For
instance, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) nd that \having a living standard above the poverty
line or a secondary school or higher education is positively associated with participation in
22violent groups." Berrebi (2007) arrive at a similar conclusion. Although our explanation
relates low willingness to reconcile to the lack of opportunities in the labor market, the results
are also consistent with the hypothesis stated by these authors that more highly educated
individuals have a more acute awareness of the political situation, resulting in deeper moral
concerns and a more negative attitude towards reconciliation.
Finally, both Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) point out the possibility
that the positive relationship between education and violence could be related to the content
of education. For instance, Stern (2000) explains how religious schools in Pakistan can induce
students to get involved in violence and terrorism. In the case of Palestine it is unlikely that
the education system itself negatively aects attitudes to reconciliation. In 2006 around
67 percent of students were enrolled in Palestinian Authority public schools, 27.2 percent in
schools run by the United Nations (UNRWA), and 6.2 percent in private or NGO-run schools,
including those linked to Hamas and other groups.11 Figure 5 shows the evolution of the
distribution of schools of each type during 2001 to 2007. The share of private schools is small
and stable over the period. So even if religious schools gained importance among private
schools, this can only be a minor phenomenon. Although it is true that the curriculum of
Palestinian public schools has been criticized for containing anti-Semitic stereotypes, this
refers to primary and secondary schools only.12 Therefore, if the content of education was
radicalizing students, it should have an eect on the whole sample. It is implausible that it
mainly aects the most highly educated individuals.
Another factor that is strongly related to attitudes towards reconciliation is the degree
of religiosity (measured as the frequency with which the individual prays). More religious
people tend be less favorable to reconciliation. Causality is not clear, since we do not know if
people with more negative attitudes towards reconciliation become more religious or if more
religious individuals changed their attitudes toward reconciliation.
To summarize, educated or religious individuals are less in favor of reconciliation with
Israel. The eect of education follows the evolution of economic conditions, particularly so
for the highly educated.
11Source: `Factbox { Facts about Palestinian schools,' Reuters Foundation, September 2006.
12This has led to the introduction of new textbooks in 2000, but the sample of individuals under analysis
has not been aected by this. For more information on the old and new textbooks see Brown (2001).
236.2.2 Heterogeneity in current economic conditions
Whereas education inuences frustration due to dierences in potential economic conditions,
other factors aect frustration through their eect on current conditions. Regional dier-
ences constitute such heterogeneity. The model suggests that individuals in a worse current
economic situation will be more frustrated and thus less willing to reconcile.
Column II of Table 6 shows that this is indeed the case for Gaza. The economy of Gaza
has been more depressed than the economy of the West Bank during the period analyzed in
this paper. The Gaza strip has high population density, is disconnected from the West Bank,
and residents face strict internal and external security controls. Since the start of the second
Intifada, closures of the border with Israel have been very prevalent, making trade and labor
movements very dicult. There has also been substantial destruction of capital (e.g. the
airport) during this period. The economic situation has been continuously worse than in the
West Bank both in terms of GDP per capita and in terms of unemployment. All of these
factors could induce more frustration and more negative attitudes towards reconciliation.
Results show that indeed, attitudes towards reconciliation are more negative among res-
idents of Gaza. This eect is less pronounced for individuals with intermediate levels of
education.
Regional economic conditions, measured by the regional unemployment rate, may also
aect attitudes. Variations in regional unemployment are at least in part due to the conict
because of border closures, preventing locals from working in Israel as in the past, and may
therefore aect attitudes. The second column shows that attitudes towards reconciliation
are indeed more negative in regions with higher unemployment. This eect is particularly
strong for individuals with low education who usually are less mobile and therefore more
strongly aected by local conditions. They also suer disproportionately high unemployment
and wage cuts when there are local labor supply shocks aecting the local unemployment
rate, as shown by Mansour (forthcoming).
Of course, the location of border closures and thus variation in regional unemployment
may be motivated by local attitudes and therefore might not be exogenous. More exogenous
variation in economic condition is provided by the construction of the separation barrier by
Israel.
24The eect of the separation barrier. In June 2002 the Israeli authorities began building
a barrier (wall) along the border of the West Bank with Israel. The Israeli government has
declared that the objective of the wall is to protect Israeli citizens from the attacks of suicide
bombers. The trajectory of the wall is depicted in Figure 6. The rst parts were built in the
northern West Bank districts of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilia. At the end of July 2003 Israel
also started building a wall in the northern and eastern parts of Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
After that, the wall continued south to Hebron. To build the wall, Palestinian land has been
expropriated. In addition, the wall at times extends far into the West Bank, leaving parts
of it inaccessible or disrupting circulation between villages.
The wall aects certain occupations more than others. Low educated individuals are
more likely to be farmers, a group particularly strongly aected by the wall, both because of
the loss of arable land and because of the disruption of transport routes.13 The prospects of
highly educated individuals are more likely to be aected by economic conditions at a more
aggregate scale. The model would thus suggest that the wall would more strongly aect
attitudes of individuals with low education.
This can be tested because the data indicate in which region individuals live. In addition,
I use measures of the evolution of the length of the wall, the areas of land left on the Israeli
side of the wall (in most of the cases, this land has been conscated) and the areas that have
become enclaves.14
I have this information for July 2003, February 2005, and July 2006. The rst two dates
correspond quite closely to the moments in time when the surveys have been conducted
(maximum dierence of three months). For 2006, the dierence is larger. To deal with this,
I assume that the parts of the wall that were under construction in July 2006 were completed
by the time of the survey, in December 2006. To construct the measures of the eect of the








13See B'Tselem report on the eects of the wall. B'Tselem is the information center for human rights in
the occupied territories.
14Sources: These measures have been computed with information from the U.N. Oce for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Aairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Palestinian Environmental NGO's
network.
25where WER refers to the eect of the wall in region R, WallR is the length of the wall
expressed in km, and BorderR refers to the length of the Green Line border for region R
expressed in km. The OutsideLandR is the area of the region that remains between the Green
Line and the wall and the EnclavesR are the areas that have become enclaves due to the route
of the wall. These areas are divided by the total area of the region and they are all expressed
in km2. Figure 6 and tables 8, 9 and 10 show the evolution of the construction of the wall
and the measures used to construct the index. While it is not obvious if the functional form
chosen is optimal for tting disruptions suered by individuals living in adjacent regions, it
receives some support from evidence suggesting that other possible measures of the eect of
the wall are correlated with the index constructed here. Using data for 2005, gure 7 shows
the relation of WER for 2005 with the number of buildings destroyed and with the amount
of land that has been expropriated. The correlation between WER and the two alternative
measures is 0.61 and 0.57 respectively.15
Because the eect of the wall diers across regions and over time, it can be distinguished
from just a year eect and from regional eects. In addition, because deviations of the wall
from the Green Line are mainly guided by the placement of Israeli settlements and by the
location of natural resources, the index is exogenous.16
Results are reported in columns IV and V in Table 6. It conrms the eects found above;
more educated or more religious people are less in favor of reconciliation. In addition, we
nd that individuals with low education living in areas strongly aected by the wall are
less favorable to reconciliation. The eect on individuals with medium or high education is
slightly negative but not signicant. This results are in line with what the model suggests.
To summarize, results show that economic conditions matter for attitudes. Current bad
conditions imply worse attitudes, as indicated by the eect of regional unemployment rates
15Note that it was not possible to directly use these alternative measure in our analysis since they are
available only for 2005.
16The Government of Israel maintains that the following considerations are taken into account when
determining the route of the wall: continuity in order to be operational, creation of controlled areas, minimum
damage to the landscape, avoidance of the inclusion of Palestinian villages in the areas of the security fence,
and minimal disruption in the daily life of the population residing near the wall. See the Israeli Ministry of
Defense's website: www.seamzone.mod.gov.il. Concerning the settlements, Ariel Sharon's cabinet agreed to
extend the wall to encircle Jewish settlements deep in the West Bank (see `Israeli cabinet extends `security
fence", The Guardian, October 2 2003). The International Court of Justice Report of 8 September 2003
(E/CN.4/2004/6) also points out that the Wall incorporates illegal Israeli settlements that form the subject
of negotiations between Israel and Palestine.
26and the separation barrier on attitudes of people with low education. In addition, attitudes
vary closely with current economic conditions. Losses suered due to the conict may also
induce resentment and thereby aect attitudes, as highly educated people, whose returns to
education are depressed relative to other countries or a situation of peace, have particularly
negative attitudes towards reconciliation.
Measuring attitudes towards the peace process in two dimensions thus resolves the con-
tradictions encountered in the earlier literature on education and attitudes towards peace. It
also allows for a richer interpretation of the relationships between demographics, economic
conditions and attitudes.
7 Conclusion
Given the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conict, hints about why it is so hard to
resolve are very valuable. In this paper, I have used Palestinian survey data to explore the
determinants of Palestinians' attitudes towards the peace process, understood as attitudes
towards possible concessions they might be willing to make to achieve a settlement, and
attitudes towards reconciliation in case of such a settlement. Because of the breadth of the
object to be measured, the use of more than one dimension is natural. This is conrmed by
the empirical analysis, which shows that the eect of education is not the same in the two
dimensions.
On economic grounds, more educated people could be expected to have more to gain
from a peace process, in particular in the context of the repressed Palestinian economy. The
empirical analysis indeed conrms that controlling for current family income more educated
people are more willing to make concessions. This could be understood as an investment
in peace, allowing the dividends of peace to be reaped later on. The eect of education
on attitudes towards reconciliation is negative. A possible explanation is that the cost of
reconciliation may be linked to the frustration endured due to the depressed labor market
conditions, and therefore may be larger for highly educated individuals, explaining why
highly educated individuals prefer lower levels of reconciliation. These detailed ndings shed
some light on why results on education appeared contradictory in previous work.
At the macro level, it is clear that there is a strong interdependence between politics and
27economics, and between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation.
While relative economic deprivation may not be associated with worse attitudes towards
reconciliation at the individual level, periods of economic stagnation or contraction coincide
with a strengthening of the negative eect of education on individuals' attitudes. I can
identify that this is not only due to direct, local eects of the separation barrier. It hence
seems plausible that conditions and events at the national level drive attitudes of people
with high education. Education and economic aid may not be sucient remedies.
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Figure 1: Average Monthly Wage in NIS for wage employees in the Palestinian Territory.
High education is bachelor and above, medium education is associate diploma and secondary
certicate and low Education is preparatory or less. Period: 2000-2006. Source: Palestinian




























Figure 2: Diagram of the underlying process.


































Figure 3: Probability Distributions of answering 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the item 'Invite an Israeli
35Figure 4: Coecients associated to the education variables in the regression on attitudes
towards concessions (top gure), dierence between the coecients associated to high edu-
cation and low education in the regression on attitudes towards concessions (middle gure)
and coecients associated to the education variables in the regression on attitudes towards
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Figure 5: Distribution of the schools by supervising authority. Source: Palestinian Education
Ministry.


































































Num Destroyed Buildings Wall Index 2005
Figure 7: Correlation between the index used and other possible measures of the eect of the
wall. The number of buildings destroyed refer to the number of establishments in dierent
sectors which were totally closed as a result of the wall, the conscated land is the total area
conscated by Israeli forces to construct the wall (usually taken by military order). Source:
PCBS { Survey on the Impact of the Expansion and Annexation Wall on the Socio-Economic
Conditions of Palestinian Localities which the Wall Passes Through, June 2005.
38B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for survey questions on reconciliation and concessions
Reconciliation Concessions
Items Mean Std.Dev Items Mean Std.Dev
Borders 3.038 0.718 Borders 67 2.458 0.729
Eco Inst. 2.781 0.760 No Army 2.110 0.769
Pol Inst. 2.220 0.785 Jerusalem 2.241 0.790
No Incitement 2.282 0.776 Refugees 2.233 0.781
Curriculum 1.714 0.665 End Conict 2.337 0.670
Invite Israeli 2.155 0.867 Security 2.072 0.867
Obs 6121 Obs 3509
Scale 1-4 Scale 1-3
Note: The 2003 survey does not contain the item `Invite an Israeli'.
Table 2: Pairwise correlation coecients for the items used to build the reconciliation and
concessions scale
Reconciliation Borders Economic Political No Incitement Curriculum Invite
Items (2001-2006) Institutions Institutions Israeli
Borders 1
Eco Inst 0.556 1
Pol Inst 0.284 0.425 1
Non Incitement 0.278 0.362 0.462 1
Curriculum 0.114 0.205 0.367 0.395 1
Invite Israeli 0.217 0.288 0.242 0.255 0.239 1
Concessions Borders No Army Jerusalem Refugees End Conict Security
Items (2003-2006) 1967
Borders 1967 1
No Army 0.363 1
Jerusalem 0.385 0.449 1
Refugees 0.350 0.386 0.471 1
End Conict 0.453 0.344 0.447 0.478 1
Security 0.442 0.418 0.416 0.435 0.508 1
Note: The 2003 survey does not contain the item `Invite an Israeli'.
39Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Personal and Demographic Characteristics
Variable 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Female 0.499 0.495 0.497 0.480 0.504
Age 35.576 35.894 36.626 35.682 35.786
std. dev (13.229) (13.523) (13.952) (12.621) (13.164)
Refugee 0.440 0.445 0.436 0.476 0.454
Low Education 0.310 0.242 0.282 0.187 0.178
Med Education 0.530 0.565 0.554 0.572 0.599
High Education 0.160 0.193 0.164 0.240 0.223
Unmarried 0.210 0.213 0.205 0.227 0.228
High Praying 0.382 0.371 0.399 0.836 0.832
Med Praying 0.379 0.370 0.382 0.072 0.079
Low Praying 0.239 0.259 0.219 0.093 0.089
Public Sector 0.090 0.117 0.111 0.121 0.142
Low Income 0.311 0.311 0.333 0.309 0.298
Med Income 0.596 0.479 0.526 0.518 0.528
High Income 0.094 0.135 0.073 0.151 0.174
Jenin 0.078 0.067 0.076 0.068 0.061
Toubas 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.022
Tulkarm 0.052 0.042 0.049 0.050 0.048
Qalqilia 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.031
Salt 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.032
Nablus 0.093 0.090 0.088 0.091 0.086
Ramallah 0.076 0.086 0.083 0.073 0.070
Jerusalem 0.074 0.081 0.076 0.098 0.094
Jericho 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.022
Bethlehem 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.047
Hebron 0.145 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.136
Jabalia 0.064 0.068 0.066 0.068 0.064
GazaCity 0.129 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.126
KhanYounis 0.075 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.072
DeirAlBaleh 0.056 0.057 0.050 0.050 0.047
Rafah 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.041
Observations 1262 1227 1224 1228 1180
40Table 4: The relationship between personal and demographic characteristics and attitudes
towards concessions.
(I) (II)
Med Education 0.203 (0.052)

















Year 2005 0.547 (0.051)
Year 2006 0.742 (0.055)
Female 0.150 (0.042) 0.141 (0.043)
Age 0.004 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
Age2 0.005 (0.010) 0.004 (0.010)
Refugee -0.125 (0.047) -0.125 (0.047)
Unmarried 0.011 (0.063) 0.016 (0.063)
Low Income 0.078 (0.047) 0.074 (0.047)
High Income 0.017 (0.067) 0.021 (0.066)
High Praying -0.287 (0.087) -0.281 (0.087)
Medium Praying -0.257 (0.090) -0.249 (0.089)
Public 0.073 (0.070) 0.069 (0.069)
Regional Dummies yes yes
Observations 3500 3500
Note: White robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 ()
percent levels, respectively.
41Table 5: The relationship between personal and demographic characteristics and attitudes
towards reconciliation
(I) (II)
Med Education -0.315 (0.037)















Year 2002 -0.352 (0.046)
Year 2003 -0.368 (0.046)
Year 2005 0.128 (0.051)
Year 2006 -0.250 (0.051)
Female -0.052 (0.032) -0.070 (0.032)
Age 0.005 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002)
Age2 -0.032 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007)
Refugee 0.020 (0.034) 0.026 (0.034)
Unmarried 0.009 (0.047) -0.188 (0.046)
Low Income -0.020 (0.035) 0.021 (0.035)
High Income 0.051 (0.051) -0.013 (0.051)
High Praying -0.463 (0.044) -0.450 (0.045)
Medium Praying -0.403 (0.045) -0.387 (0.040)
Public -0.081 (0.058) -0.114 (0.058)
Regional Dummies yes yes
Observations 6121 6121
Note: White robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 ()
percent levels, respectively.
42Table 6: The eect of dierent economic changes on the attitudes towards reconciliation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
All Gaza Reg U Wall Wall WB
Med Educ -0.315  -0.508  -0.526  -0.338  -0.466 
(0.037) (0.044) (0.056) (0.044) (0.054)
High Educ -0.458  -0.652  -0.681  -0.489  -0.547 
(0.052) (0.062) (0.082) (0.060) (0.078)
Year 2002 -0.352  -0.409  -0.39  -0.348  -0.515 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.058)
Year 2003 -0.368  -0.411  -0.368  -0.350  -0.404 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.050) (0.063)
Year 2005 0.128  0.033 0.064 0.150  -0.006
(0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.067)
Year 2006 -0.250  -0.332  -0.285  -0.207  -0.348 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.062) (0.084)






Med Educ*Reg.U 0.028 
(0.007)




Med Educ*Wall 0.084  0.067
(0.049) (0.051)
High Educ*Wall 0.104  -0.107
(0.063) (0.073)
Wall -0.112  -0.113 
(0.050) (0.053)
Observations 6121 6121 6121 6121 3851
Note: The dierent regressions include dierent variables: (1) uses all the sample and is the same regression as
shown in Table 5, (2) includes the variable Gaza (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual
lives in Gaza) and its interaction with education, (3) includes the variable Reg.U, which is a measure of
regional unemployment obtained from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, (4) includes the variable
Wall, which is the measure of the eect of the wall discussed in Section 6.2.2 and (5) includes the variable
Wall and only uses the sample of individuals living in the West Bank. All the regression include regional
dummies and the controls shown in tables 4 and 5. White robust standard errors in parentheses; stars
indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 () percent levels, respectively.
43A Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate
the individual's attitudes towards reconciliation.
 After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps may be taken
in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. For each
of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:
{ Open borders to free movement of people and goods.
{ Create joint economic institutions and ventures.
{ Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed eventually to lead to
a confederate system)
{ Take legal measures against incitement against Israel.
{ Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches
school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.
 After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you, under these conditions of
peace, invite an Israeli colleague to visit you in your home?
A.2 Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate
the individual's attitudes towards concessions.
The individuals are informed of the permanent compromise settlement, then they are ask what do
they think of each of the following items (Do they agree or disagree with them):
 Withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap. (An Israeli withdrawal from all of the
Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws
and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less
than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from
Israel in accordance with the attached map show map. )
 A state without an army but with international forces. (An independent Palestinian state
would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force
but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security
of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each
other.)
 East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided. (East Jerusalem would
become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Pales-
tinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City
(including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception
of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.)
44 Refugees with ve options for permanent residence. (With regard to the refugee question,
both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the
Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given ve choices for permanent residency. These
are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the
territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return
to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries,
and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of
refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to
third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to
compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.)
 End the conict. (When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean
the end of the conict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will
recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.)
 A sovereign state with security arrangements. (The Palestinian state will have sovereignty
over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace
for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15
years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indenite period
of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and
to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international
border crossings.)
A.3 Testing the assumptions required for identication in the item
response model
To evaluate whether the assumptions of unidimensionality, local independence and monotonicity
that are required for identication are fullled in the data, I use Mokken scale analysis.17 This
method is based on the fact that item response models imply that for dichotomous items there
is stochastic ordering of the latent variable by the sum of the scores (X+ =
P
j Xj). van der
Ark (2005) shows that generally, the stochastic ordering also holds for polytomous items if the
number of items is larger than ve. Therefore, Mokken scale analysis can be used to investi-
gate the assumptions of our model. Sijtsma and Molenaar (2002) show that the assumptions of
unidimensionality, local independence, and latent monotonicity imply the following testable restric-
tions: a) 0  Hij  1, for all i 6= j, where Hij is the item-pair scalability coecient, dened as
Hij = cov(Xi;Xj)=cov(Xi;Xj)max; b) 0  Hj  1 for all j, where Hj is the item scalability coe-
cient dened as Hj = cov(Xj;R j)=cov(Xj;R j)max and R j is the total score minus the score of
the item of which the response probabilities are investigated; c) 0  H  1, where H is the scalabil-





The scalability coecient H for the scale on concessions is 0:503 and for the scale on reconciliation
is 0:432. Table 7 shows the other scalability coecients for both scales; concessions and reconcilia-
tion. The values of these coecients are in almost all the cases greater than 0.3, the rule of thumb
threshold indicating that the scale constructed with this data fullls the assumptions required by
the model.
17For a more detailed explanation of the Mokken scale see Mokken (1971) and Mokken (1982). For an
extension to polytomous items see Molenaar (1997). The implementations of the Mokken scale has been













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46A.4 Information used to construct the Wall-Index
Table 8: Summary of the wall and its eects in 2003, by region
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
km2 km2 km2 Border km km Index
Jenin 587.838 33.891 0.000 50.02 61.421 1.286
Toubas 352.811 0.000 0.000 13.092 0.000 0.000
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 46.16 2.759
Salt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 4.003 0.715
Ramallah 849.188 0.000 0.000 46.283 0.000 0.000
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 15.856 0.579
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 0.000 0.000 91.817 0.000 0.000
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
47Table 9: Summary of the wall and its eects in 2005, by region
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
km2 km2 km2 Border km km Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.333
Salt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 18.134 3.239
Ramallah 849.188 7.761 0.000 46.283 26.31 0.578
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 25.176 0.920
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 2.325 0.000 91.817 14.658 0.162
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 10: Summary of the wall and its eects in 2006, by region
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
km2 km2 km2 Border km km Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 37.318 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.416
Salt 211.175 13.567 0.000 5.598 25.86 4.684
Ramallah 849.188 84.521 1.512 46.283 59.158 1.379
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 93.466 13.883 27.375 80.724 3.260
Bethlehem 637.548 8.815 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.485
Hebron 1007.135 12.71 0.000 91.817 64.757 0.718
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
48